To restore voters’ trust in mainstream liberal democracy, Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s administration has to deliver the change it promised in opposition. To do that, the government needs a new approach to power.

It needs to decide who has too little power, who has too much, and how it is going to fix that. This will require a clear appraisal of the ideas that cast necessary change as politically ‘impossible’, and the bravery to take on such ideas and those who enforce and promote them.

And to act on this, it needs to inhabit and wield its own power more effectively. This will require radical reform of the state.

This report explores how power is distributed across the public and private sectors, the ideas that underpin this, and how they need to change, on the basis of a new theory of power.

Chapter 1 uses polling and other evidence to sketch out the public’s current, toxic theory of power, its implications for democracy, and why a new theory of power is needed to drive change and show that mainstream democratic politics can deliver.

Chapter 2 draws on history and political science to develop this new theory of power: how old fears hem politicians in, and how a broken status quo can be replaced by a new normal based on more pressing priorities. It also explores apparently neutral ideas, such as quantification and administration which rely heavily on rules, which fix the status quo in place, and which an effective government must interrogate.

Chapters 3-6 then trace this process through four key areas of public life to show how this thinking both centralises and disperses power. In broad terms, power has been sucked out of local government and autonomous institutions and up to the national level – only to be dispersed again within the broad centre of power, across public and private sectors, to the point where responsibility sits in so many places, it sits nowhere. This combines the downsides of both the centralisation and the dispersal of power. These chapters examine how the current government has challenged this so far, and what more it can do to escape the broken status quo. Each chapter focuses on an example of the same basic historical process of power shift laid out in Chapter 2; they can therefore be read in any order.

Chapter 3 concentrates on the power of the Treasury, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). It argues that these organisations have institutionalised a distrust in the ability of politicians to handle the public finances which is based on particular ideological beliefs about the state, as entrenched through the 1976 International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis and ‘Black Wednesday’ in 1992. This institutionalised distrust excessively constrains the role of principled political judgement, and erodes trust in
democratic government.

It recommends that the government:

  • Embrace the fact that economic forecasting is political and uncertain, and that politics is finally a matter of principled judgement, not a process of conforming to uncertain forecasts or obeying rules.
  • Set clear goals and stick to them, on the basis of that principled judgement. If the government’s pursuit of these goals remains visibly steadfast in the face of shifting predictions, the sense of trust and certainty that follows will stimulate private investment in line with the government’s goals.
  • Reassert the primacy of the democratically elected government over the Bank of England, not by abolishing its independence, but by politely reminding the Bank whence its authority is derived, and inviting it into a closer, more co-operative relationship. This should involve a regular review of the MPC’s mandate in the light of current economic pressures.
  • Encourage the Bank to go beyond its welcome scaling back of quantitative tightening by addressing the remaining costs that this policy is imposing on the public.
  • Clearly communicate to the public that OBR projections are not, and never could be, precise predictions, and encourage journalists to master this concept.

Chapter 4 focuses on the power of large corporations and their major shareholders. It argues that outdated concepts of shareholder primacy, alongside legally questionable claims about the need to prioritise fiduciary duty above duties to all other stakeholders, have helped to concentrate ownership and power. This erodes public trust in democratic government, impedes growth and deprives the state of tax revenue.

It recommends that the government:

  • Encourage big businesses to involve themselves in local communities by incorporating public spaces into their real estate, avoiding neglect of their assets in high streets, and maximising local managers’ autonomy to engage in local initiatives.
  • Facilitate the establishment of regional banks committed to playing an active role in their communities.
  • Propose a grand bargain with business on regulation, whereby government frees business from unnecessary complexity and risk aversion, in return for business acceptance of regulation that focuses on protecting consumers, maintaining proper market competition, and fostering innovation.
  • Encourage constructive approaches which move away from narrow shareholder primacy on the grounds that evidence suggests businesses with empowered, motivated employees and other stakeholders can thrive. If need be, company law could be revised to reflect this.
  • Use procurement more proactively to favour businesses that can demonstrate that they pay their taxes, and/ or whose approach benefits the public by rejecting narrow shareholder primacy, along with social enterprises.

Chapter 5 draws together the privatised utilities, outsourcing and consultancies. It argues that 1970s beliefs about the self-serving nature of civil servants and unionised workers, and about the inherent inefficiency of the state, led to increasing reliance on the private sector to deliver what were once core state functions. This has generated a cycle of dependency, eroding state capacity, and has dispersed power and responsibility, damaging democratic government’s ability to deliver its promises and protect the public interest, in turn damaging public trust.

It recommends that the government:

  • Acknowledge that the current case against water nationalisation – ‘the government can’t afford it’ – is inadequate, and either make the case for private ownership afresh (and framed positively) or consider previously unthinkable options, including renationalisation.
  • Extend its moves to reverse the outsourcing model, normalising a broad understanding of ‘insourcing’, to include social enterprise as well as revived state capacity.
  • Develop the model of reform advocated in Josh MacAlister’s Independent Report on Children’s Social Care and extend it to other service areas, such as early years provision and adult social care. This reduces service demand to tip the balance of power away from suppliers to the state and towards those citizens who use the services in question.
  • Phase out reliance on generalist consultancies as a default, in favour of retaining and developing in-house learning. End the routine use of ongoing ‘call-off’ contracts with these firms by investing the cost of renewing such contracts in advance to restore state capacity. Radically reform risk-averse civil service procurement policy to remove the incentive for such contracts. Stop incentivising civil servants to change jobs so frequently that they cannot take responsibility for completing projects or develop and deploy specialist expertise.

Chapter 6 explores the confluences of two controversial policy areas that concern where people get to live – the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and housing and planning policy – alongside a legal mechanism relevant to both: judicial review. It argues that in housing and planning, we have entrenched the state’s power to block and dissipated its power to build. More broadly, we have come to rely excessively on systems of rules, rather than democratic political judgement. The importance of protecting our fundamental human rights should be self-evident; the best way to restore the legitimacy of the existing system is to reform it, to ensure it achieves a fair and broadly accepted balance between the rights of the individual and the capacity of the democratically run state to govern on behalf of the public.

It recommends that the government:

  • Proceed with legislating, as promised, to tighten the application of Article 8 of the ECHR to give greater weight to the public interest. Identify and stop any misapplications of Article 8 by case workers and first-tier tribunals. Set this in the context of both reasserting the authority of democratic governments, and remaking the case for human rights as a defence against abusive power. Underline that this dual approach is complementary, not contradictory, and that it offers the best route to relegitimise the Convention. And overcome the fear that has developed in Whitehall of fighting cases in the European Court.
  • Continue to tackle regulatory obstacles to housebuilding. In the short-term, building 1.5m homes by 2029 may require turning the Ministry of Housing into a mission-driven task force, convening regular meetings with developers, utility companies and local authorities to identify and remove blockages, with ministers making bolder use of their powers. In the longer term, sustained housebuilding at the required scale may be best served by reviving the state’s capacity to build at a local and regional level, and by moving away from a system based on extreme risk aversion, confrontation and exploitation of process complexity towards one based more on trust.

These and other recommendations are all designed to be in pursuit of the goals set out in the conclusion: that it is now urgently necessary to reject the idea that the democratically run state is inherently inefficient, and to restore trust as a central principle in intra- and inter-organisational power relationships. It proposes a three-step approach:

Step 1: Reject the claim that government is the public’s enemy

Challenge and overcome outdated fears that block necessary action. Recognise that given the crisis of public trust in democracy, caution is often as risky as risk. Accept criticism of state failure and drive radical reform, but always on the basis of restoring the standing of the democratically run state as the public’s representative in national power struggles.

Step 2: Reassert democratic political power,
as enacted through the state

Replace rules, projections and a fear of uncertainty with confidence expressed through principles, and a greater role for trust and direct personal responsibility.

Step 3: Side with the public against its
powerful enemies

Call out the ways private power disempowers the public, and demonstrate that the democratically run state is the antidote. By confidently reasserting the legitimacy of public power, expressed through the state, the government can seize a once-in-a-generation opportunity to shift power in ways that improve working people’s lives.